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Introduction
We explain the raison d’eˆtre and basic ideas of our game-theoretic approach
to normative multi-agent systems, sketching the central elements with pointers
to other publications for detailed developments. In particular, we address the
following questions:
Motivation. Why do we need a game-theoretic approach to normative multi-
agent systems?
Objectives. What do we want to achieve with the theory of normative multi-
agent systems?
Methodology. How do we achieve the objectives?
Results. Which results have been obtained thus far?
Interdisciplinarity. How are various disciplines used in the theory?
We aim to explain our own approach, and we are therefore very brief with
respect to recent related approaches in the area of normative multiagent sys-
tems. For these other approaches, see the special issue on normative multiagent
systems in Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory [68], these
DROPS proceedings, the proceedings of the biannual workshops on deontic logic
in computer science (∆EON) and of the COIN workshop series.1
The layout of this paper follows the five questions above, addressing each of
them in a new section.
1 http://www.ia.urjc.es/COIN2007/
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1 Motivation for a new approach to normative systems
In Section 1.1 we explain why we need a theory of norms by arguing that norms
are a special class of constraints deserving special analysis. In Section 1.2 we
define what we mean by a norm, distinguishing among regulative, constitutive
and procedural ones, and in Section 1.3 we explain why a normative system in
multi-agent systems is seen as a mechanism, in particular to obtain desirable
agent behavior or to structure organizations. Finally we explain in Section 1.4
what we mean by game-theoretic scenarios in normative multi-agent systems,
and in Section 1.5 we discuss an important advantage of our game-theoretic
approach, which we call the game-theoretic analysis of normative multi-agent
systems.
1.1 Norms are a class of constraints deserving special analysis
Meyer and Wieringa define normative systems as “systems in the behavior of
which norms play a role and which need normative concepts in order to be
described or specified” [100, preface]. Alchourro`n and Bulygin [2] define a nor-
mative system inspired by Tarskian deductive systems:
“When a deductive correlation is such that the first sentence of the or-
dered pair is a case and the second is a solution, it will be called norma-
tive. If among the deductive correlations of the set α there is at least one
normative correlation, we shall say that the set α has normative conse-
quences. A system of sentences which has some normative consequences
will be called a normative system.” [2, p.55].
Jones and Carmo [89] introduce agents in the definition of a normative system
by defining it as “sets of agents whose interactions are norm-governed; the norms
prescribe how the agents ideally should and should not behave. [...] Importantly,
the norms allow for the possibility that actual behavior may at times deviate
from the ideal, i.e., that violations of obligations, or of agents’ rights, may occur.”
Since the agents’ control over the norms is not explicit here, we use the following
definition.
A normative multi-agent system is a multi-agent system together with
normative systems in which agents can decide whether to follow the
explicitly represented norms or not, and the normative systems specify
how and in which extent the agents can modify the norms. [68]
Note that this definition makes no presumptions about the internal architecture
of an agent or of the way norms find their expression in agent’s behavior.
Representation of norms Since norms are explicitly represented, according
to our definition of a normative multi-agent system, the question should be
raised how norms are represented. Norms can be interpreted as a special kind
of constraint, and represented depending on the domain in which they occur.
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Normative Multi-Agent Systems 3
However, the representation of norms by domain dependent constraints runs
into the question what happens when norms are violated. Not all agents behave
according to the norm, and the system has to deal with it. In other words,
norms are not hard constraints, but soft constraints. For example, the system
may sanction violations or reward good behavior. Thus, the normative system
has to monitor the behavior of agents and enforce the sanctions. Also, when
norms are represented as domain dependent constraints, the question will be
raised how to represent permissive norms, and how they relate to obligations.
Whereas obligations and prohibitions can be represented as constraints, this does
not seem to hold for permissions. For example, how to represent the permission
to access a resource under an access control system? Finally, when norms are
represented as domain dependent constraints, the question can be raised how
norms evolve.
We therefore believe that norms should be represented as a domain inde-
pendent theory. For example, deontic logic [94,95,96,109,110,117] studies logical
relations among obligations and permissions, and more in particular violations
and contrary-to-duty obligations, permissions and their relation to obligations,
and the dynamics of obligations over time. Therefore, insights from deontic logic
can be used to represent and reason with norms in multi-agent systems. Deontic
logic also offers representations of norms as rules or conditionals. However, there
are several aspects of norms which are not covered by constraints nor by deontic
logic, such as the relation among the cognitive abilities of agents and the global
properties of norms. Meyer and Wieringa explain why normative systems are
intimately related with deontic logic.
“Until recently in specifications of systems in computational environ-
ments the distinction between normative behavior (as it should be) and
actual behavior (as it is) has been disregarded: mostly it is not possible
to specify that some system behavior is non-normative (illegal) but nev-
ertheless possible. Often illegal behavior is just ruled out by specification,
although it is very important to be able to specify what should happen if
such illegal but possible behaviors occurs! Deontic logic provides a means
to do just this by using special modal operators that indicate the status
of behavior: that is whether it is legal (normative) or not” [100, preface].
Norms and agents Conte et al. [76] distinguish two distinct sets of problems
in normative multi-agent systems research. On the one hand, they claim that
legal theory and deontic logic supply a theory of norm-governed interaction of
autonomous agents while at the same time lacking a model that integrates the
different social and normative concepts of this theory. On the other hand, they
claim that three other problems are of interest in multi-agent systems research
on norms: how agents can acquire norms, how agents can violate norms, and
how an agent can be autonomous. Agent decision making in normative systems
and the relation between desires and obligations has been studied in agent ar-
chitectures [72], which thus explain how norms and obligations influence agent
behavior.
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An important question in normative multi-agent systems is where norms
come from. Norms are not necessarily created by legislators, but they can also
be negotiated among agents, or they can emerge spontaneously, making the
agents norm autonomous [112]. In electronic commerce research, for example,
cognitive foundations of social norms and contracts are studied [58]. Protocols
and social mechanisms are now being developed to support such creations of
norms in multi-agent systems. Moreover, agents like legislators playing a role in
the normative system have to be regulated themselves by procedural norms [67],
raising the question how these new kind of norms are related to the other kinds
of norms.
When norms are created, the question can be raised how they are enforced.
For example, when a contract is violated, the violator may have to pay a penalty.
But then there has to be a monitoring and sanctioning system, for example police
agents in an electronic institution. Such protocols or roles in a multi-agent system
are part of the construction of social reality, and Searle [105] has argued that such
social realities are constructed by constitutive norms. This raises the question
how to represent such constitutive or counts-as norms, and how they are related
to regulative norms like obligations and permissions [62].
Norms and other concepts Not only the relation between norms and agents
must be studied, but also the relation between norms and other social and le-
gal concepts. How do norms structure organizations? How do norms coordinate
groups and societies? How about the contract frames in which contracts live?
How about the relation between legal courts? Though in some normative multi-
agent systems there is only a single normative system, there can also be several
of them, raising the question how normative systems interact. For example, in
a virtual community of resource providers each provider may have its own nor-
mative system, which raises the question how one system can authorize access
in another system, or how global policies can be defined to regulate these local
policies [62].
1.2 Kinds of norms
Normative multiagent systems as a research area can be defined as the inter-
section of normative systems and multi-agent systems [68]. With ‘normative’
we mean ‘conforming to or based on norms’, as in normative behavior or nor-
mative judgments. According to the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary [99],
other meanings of normative not considered here are ‘of, relating to, or deter-
mining norms or standards’, as in normative tests, or ‘prescribing norms’, as in
normative rules of ethics or normative grammar. With ‘norm’ we mean ‘a prin-
ciple of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide,
control, or regulate proper and acceptable behavior’. Other meanings of ‘norm’
given by the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary but not considered here are ‘an
authoritative standard or model’, ‘an average like a standard, typical pattern,
widespread practice or rule in a group’, and various definitions used in math-
ematics. Kinds of norms which are usually distinguished are regulative norms
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like obligations, permissions and prohibitions, constitutive norms like counts-as
conditionals, and more, as discussed below.
Regulative norms: obligations, permissions, prohibitions Regulative
norms specify the ideal and varying degrees of sub-ideal behavior of a system
by means of obligations, prohibitions and permissions. Deontic logic [6,118] con-
siders logical relations among obligations and permissions and focuses on the
description of the ideal or optimal situation to achieve, driven by representa-
tion problems expressed by the so-called deontic paradoxes, most notoriously
the contrary-to-duty paradoxes, see, for example, [89,110].
Constitutive norms: counts-as conditionals Constitutive norms are based
on the notion that “X counts-as Y in context C” and are used to support reg-
ulative norms by introducing institutional facts in the representation of legal
reality.
The notion of counts-as introduced by Searle [105] has been interpreted in
deontic logic in different ways and it seems to refer to different albeit related
phenomena [85]. For example, Jones and Sergot [90] consider counts-as from
the constitutive point of view. According to Jones and Sergot, the fact that A
counts-as B in context C is read as a statement to the effect that A represents
conditions for guaranteeing the applicability of particular classificatory cate-
gories. The counts-as guarantees the soundness of that inference, and enables
“new” classifications which would otherwise not hold.
An alternative view of the counts-as relation is proposed by Grossi et al. [84]:
according to the classificatory perspective A counts-as B in context C is inter-
preted as: A is classified as B in context C. In other words, the occurrence of
A is a sufficient condition, in context C, for the occurrence of B. Via counts-as
statements, normative systems can establish the ontology they use in order to
distribute obligations, rights, prohibitions, permissions, etc. See [54] for a dis-
cussion on the relation between count-as conditionals, classification and context.
In [42,52,58] we propose a different view of counts-as which focuses on the
fact that counts-as often provides an abstraction mechanism in terms of institu-
tional facts, allowing the regulative rules to refer to legal notions which abstract
from details. Counts-as conditionals can be used to define other concepts, such
as role-based Rights in Artificial Social Systems [50]. In [51,60] we study the
relation between obligations, permissions and constitutive norms using a logical
architecture.
Procedural norms The distinction between substantive and procedural norms
is well known in legal theory [98]. Substantive norms define the legal relationships
of people with other people and the state in terms of regulative and constitutive
norms, where regulative norms are obligations, prohibitions and permissions,
and constitutive norms state what counts as institutional facts in a normative
system. Procedural norms are instrumental norms, addressed to agents playing
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roles in the normative system, which aim at achieving the social order specified
in terms of substantive norms. Procedural law encompasses legal rules govern-
ing the process for settlement of disputes (criminal and civil). Procedural and
substantive law are complementary. Procedural law brings substantive law to
life and enables rights and duties to be enforced and defended. For example,
procedural norms explain how a trial should be carried out and which are the
duties, rights and powers of judges, lawyers and defendants.
The role that agents have in enforcing the social order the normative system
aims to by creating norms has been recognized in normative multi-agent systems
[58,62], and agents are considered which are in charge of sanctioning violations
on behalf of the normative system [33,39]. Moreover, obligations are associated
with procedural norms which are instrumental - to use Hart [86]’s terminology -
to distribute the tasks to agents like judges and policemen, who have to decide
whether and how to fulfill them.
In [55,67] we introduce a logical framework for substantive and procedural
norms, and we use it to study the relation between these two kinds of norms
and to answer the following three questions. First, how are regulative and con-
stitutive norms related in a normative system with substantive and procedural
norms? Second, by which mechanism are procedural norms created to motivate
agents to recognize violations, apply sanctions, or to recognize institutional facts?
Third, how can the formal framework be used to model various applications of
normative multi-agent systems, where only some of them may need procedural
norms?
1.3 Normative system as a mechanism
In this section we discuss why there are norms in social systems like multi-agent
systems. We have distinguished various kinds of norms, such as obligations or
counts-as conditionals, but this does not explain their existence. We assume that
a norm is a mechanism to obtain desired multi-agent system behavior. In other
words, it is an incentive, which brings us directly into the study of incentives,
called economics.
Norms as a mechanism to obtain desirable agent behavior Norms have
for long been considered as one of the possible incentives to motivate agents.
Consider the economist Levitt [92, p.18-20], discussing an example of Gneezy
and Rustichini [81].
Imagine for a moment that you are the manager of a day-care center.
You have a clearly stated policy that children are supposed to be picked
up by 4 p.m. But very often parents are late. The result: at day’s end,
you have some anxious children and at least a teacher must wait around
for the parents to arrive. What to do?
A pair of economists who heard of this dilemma – it turned out to be
a rather common one – offered a solution: fine the tardy parents. Why,
after all, should the day-care center take care of these kids for free?
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The economists decided to test their solution by conducting a study of
ten day-care centers in Haifa, Israel. The study lasted twenty weeks, but
the fine was not introduced immediately. For the first four weeks, the
economists simply kept track of the number of participants who came
late; there were, on average, eight pickups per week per day-center. In
the fifth week, the fine was enacted. It was announced that any parent
arriving more than ten minutes late would pay $3 per child for each
incident. The fee would be added to the parents’ monthly bill, which
was roughly $380.
After the fine was enacted, the number of late pickups promptly went
. . . up. Before long there were twenty late pickups per week, more than
double the original average. The incentive had plainly backfired.
Economics is, at root, the study of incentives: how people get what they
want, or need, especially when other people want or need the same thing.
Economists love incentives. They love to dream them up and enact them,
study them and tinker with them. The typical economist believes the
world has not yet invented a problem that he cannot fix if given a free
hand to design the proper incentive scheme. His solution may not always
be pretty–but the original problem, rest assured, will be fixed. An in-
centive is a bullet, a lever, a key: an often tiny object with astonishing
power to change a situation.
. . .
There are three basic flavors of incentive: economic, social, and moral.
Very often a single incentive scheme will include all three varieties. Think
about the anti-smoking campaign of recent years. The addition of $3-per-
pack “sin tax” is a strong economic incentive against buying cigarettes.
The banning of cigarettes in restaurants and bars is a powerful social
incentive. And when the U.S. government asserts that terrorists raise
money by selling black-market cigarettes, that acts as a rather jarring
moral incentive.
The daycare example illustrates that norms can be used as a mechanism
to obtain desirable behavior of a multiagent system, because it is used as one
of the incentives. It suggests also that the main tools to study incentives in
economics, classical decision and game theory, may be useful tools to study the
role of normative incentives too. Note that the daycare example illustrates also
that economic theory is concerned with normative reasoning too, and that an
analysis of incentives should not naively restrict itself to economic incentives,
because it should also take norms into account.
The fact that norms can be used as an mechanism to obtain desirable system
behavior, i.e. that norms can be used as incentives for agents, implies that in some
circumstances economic incentives are not sufficient to obtain such behavior. For
example, in a widely discussed example of the so-called centipede game, there
is a pile of thousand pennies, and two agents can in turn either take one or two
pennies. If an agent takes one then the other agent takes turn, if it takes two then
the game ends. A backward induction argument implies that it is rational only
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to take two at the first turn. Norms and trust have been discussed to analyze
this behavior, see [87] for a discussion.
Norms as a mechanism to organize systems To manage properly complex
systems like multiagent systems, it is necessary that they have a modular design.
While in traditional software systems, modularity is addressed via the notions
of class and object, in multiagent systems the notion of organization is borrowed
from the ontology of social systems. Organizing a multiagent system allows to
decompose it and defining different levels of abstraction when designing it.
According to Zambonelli et al. [119] “a multiagent system can be conceived
in terms of an organized society of individuals in which each agent plays spe-
cific roles and interacts with other agents”. At the same time, they claim that
“an organization is more than simply a collection of roles (as most methodolo-
gies assume) [...] further organization-oriented abstractions need to be devised
and placed in the context of a methodology [...] As soon as the complexity in-
creases, modularity and encapsulation principles suggest dividing the system
into different suborganizations”. According to Jennings [88], however, most cur-
rent approaches “possess insufficient mechanisms for dealing with organisational
structure”. Moreover, what is the semantic principle which allows decomposing
organizations into suborganizations must be still made precise. Organizations are
modelled as collections of agents, gathered in groups [78], playing roles [88,97]
or regulated by organizational rules [119].
Norms are another answer to the question of how to model organizations as
first class citizens in multiagent systems. Norms are not usually addressed to in-
dividual agents, but rather they are addressed to roles played by agents [65]. In
this way, norms from a mechanism to obtain the behavior of agents, also become
a mechanism to create the organizational structure of multiagent systems. The
aim of an organizational structure is to coordinate the behavior of agents so to
perform complex tasks which cannot be done by individual agents. In organiz-
ing a system all types of norms are necessary, in particular, constitutive norms,
which are used to assign powers to agents playing roles inside the organization.
Such powers allow to give commands to other agents, make formal communica-
tions and to restructure the organization itself, for example, by managing the
assignment of agents to roles.
Moreover, normative systems allow to model also the structure of an organi-
zation and not only the interdependences among the agents of an organization.
Consider a simple example from organizational theory in Economics: an enter-
prise which is composed by a direction area and a production area. The direction
area is composed by the CEO and the board. The board is composed by a set
of administrators. The production area is composed by two production units;
each production unit by a set of workers. The direction area, the board, the
production area and the production units are functional areas. In particular, the
direction area and the production areas belong to the organization, the board
to the direction area, etc. The CEO, the administrators and the members of
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the production units are roles, each one belonging to a functional area, e.g., the
CEO is part of the direction area.
This recursive decomposition terminates with roles: roles, unlike organiza-
tions and functional areas, are not composed by further social entities. Rather,
roles are played by other agents, real agents (human or software) who have to
act as expected by their role.
Each of these elements can be seen as an institution in a normative system,
where legal institutions are defined by Ruiter [104] as “systems of [regulative and
constitutive] rules that provide frameworks for social action within larger rule-
governed settings”. They are “relatively independent institutional legal orders
within the comprehensive legal orders”.
1.4 Game-theoretic scenarios of normative multiagent systems
In this section we explain our game-theoretic foundations for norms [59].
Interactions among agents in a normative multiagent system Many
examples are given in the literature on the interaction among agents using reg-
ulative norms. For example, consider the following simple scenario due to Ron
Lee of the access to a photo copier [91]:
1. A tells B to permit C to do use photocopier
2. B permits C to do use photocopier
3. C cannot do use copier, since door is closed
4. A complains to B about C not able to use it
5. B tells A that he permitted C, as requested
The standard analysis of this example includes the idea that C has the right to
use the photocopies in the sense that he is entitled to use it, and B is therefore
obliged to open the door. Moreover, as the photocopier has an access code, then
B has to tell the code to C (even though C would be able to use the copier if
he where to guess the code, which is the point where knowledge gets into this
scenario). There are many variants of this example due to Sergot and colleagues,
such as borrowing books in the library regulations formalized, parking cars in the
parking lot in the parking regulations, and so on. Typically, many more agents
are involved in these real world examples than just A, B and C. In multiagent
systems, similar scenarios can be found in access control systems, for example
to access a web service.
A similar example is often discussed where permission is replaced by obliga-
tion (where A like to transmit its will to influence the behavior of C via B):
1. A tells B to oblige C to do copies of a paper.
2. B obliges C to do copies of a paper
3. C does not do copies of a paper
4. A complains to B about C not doing copies of a paper
5. B tells A that he obliged C, as requested
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Contracts are based on norms and occur in strategic interaction scenarios
found in e-commerce, as studied by Tan and colleagues [83]. In an escrow ser-
vice or a bill of lading typically several buyers, sellers, transporters, financial
institutions and other agents are involved, which regulate their interactions via
complex contracts. Here norms are used to give agents the power to achieve
things.
When more agents are involved, their social interactions may give rise to the
emergence of norms. For example, in case there is no trust there is no deal due
to lack of equilibrium. If there is a joint goal based on agent desires then the
agents can propose or negotiate norms leading to a new equilibrium, in which
they accept the norms.
In most human social systems it takes a long time to emerge, but in computer
systems they can be created much more quickly. For example, consider a peer
to peer ad hoc network used for incident management. In case of an incident
such as fire in a tunnel, cars, police, firemen, hospitals and so on have to be
coordinated.
Another source for social interaction scenarios can be found in the popular re-
ality games such as second life, where we expect many applications of normative
multiagent systems.
Complexity and abstraction All these examples of interaction scenarios show
highly complex and dynamic systems, and the question is how we can model the
examples - whether it is to develop multi-agent systems in agent based software
engineering, or to analyze the multi-agent system in agent theory. There are two
main approaches to reduce the complexity.
First, the usual approach to reduce the complexity is to describe agents
using a simple and uniform formalization. For example, classical game theory
describes all agents by utility function and probability distribution, together
with the decision rule to maximize expected utility, and alternative agent models
developed in artificial intelligence and cognitive science are based on models such
as belief-intention-desire (BDI) model.
Second, an alternative approach to reduce the complexity is to restrict the
number of agents which are considered in the interaction. Here the multi-agent
structure of normative systems can be used. For example, legal systems are based
on the Trias Politica [39]. From the perspective of a normative system, there are
two kinds of agents. First, the agents who are subject to the norms, and the
agents who play a role in the system to make it function. This generates to
the distinction between substantive norms used to regulate agents subject to
the system, and procedural norms used to regulate agents playing a role in the
system.
Normative system as a level of abstraction One way we can simplify inter-
action in a normative multiagent system is to abstract away the agents playing
a role in the normative system, and keeping the normative system as an entity
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interacting with the agents subject to it. The agents playing a role in the sys-
tem empower the normative system, and the normative system delegates again
some of its powers to these agents; this is known as mutual empowerment. This
level of abstraction is most clear in organizational theory, where an organization
can be seen as a normative multiagent system as well as a legal entity. One can
use the agent metaphor for such abstracted normative systems, for example by
attributing mental attitudes to normative systems [32].
The sociologist Goffman sees norms as producing a form of strategic inter-
action between the agent and the normative system. In a normative system, the
“enforcement power is taken from mother nature and invested in a social office
specialized for this purpose, namely a body of officials empowered to make fi-
nal judgements and to institute payments” [82, p.115]. Such a game is unusual
since “the judges and their actions will not be fully fixed in the environment,
many unnatural things are possible. [...] the payment for a player’s move ceases
to be automatic but is decided on and made by the judges where everything is
over” [82, p.115]. “Strategic interaction” here means the, according to Goffman
unavoidable, taking into consideration of the other agents’ actions.
“When an agent considers which course of action to follow, before he
takes a decision, he depicts in his mind the consequences of his action
for the other involved agents, their likely reaction, and the influence of
this reaction on his own welfare” [82, p. 12].
At this level of abstraction, the simplest game which can be played is an agent
deliberating about an action, and the normative system reacting to it. Since the
goal of the agent is typically to violate the norms without being sanctioned, we
call this kind of interaction a violation game, and we represent it by A:N. Other
kinds of interactions at this abstraction level are extensions of violation games.
consider for example a (legislator in a) normative system deliberating which
norm to create. He can introduce a norm, then an agent will play a violation
game. The goal of the normative system is that the agent is motivated such that
the norm is not violated. We call it a norm creation game, and we abstractly
represent it by N:A:N. Also more complex interactions among agents can be
modelled in this way, for example involving control hierarchies such as defender
agents, various kinds of authorities like norm source hierarchies, and so on.
1.5 The game-theoretic analysis of norms
Norms should satisfy various properties to be effective as a mechanism to obtain
desirable behavior. For example, the system should not sanction without reason,
as for example Caligula or Nero did in the ancient Roman times, otherwise the
norms would loose their force to motivate agents. Moreover, sanctions should
not be too low, as in the daycare example, but they also should not be too high,
as shown by the argument of Beccaria [14] on death penalty. Otherwise, once a
norm is violated, there is no way to prevent further norm violations. In [59] we
list the following requirements for such an analysis.
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The first requirement is that norms influence the behavior of agents. However,
they only have to do so under normal or typical circumstances. For example, if
other agents are not obeying the norm, then we cannot expect an agent to do so.
This norm acceptance has been studied by [76], and in a game-theoretic setting
for social laws by [108].
The second requirement is that even if a norm is accepted in the sense that
the other agents obey the norm, an agent should be able to violate the norms. A
normative multi-agent system is a “set of agents [...] whose interactions can be
regarded as norm-governed; the norms prescribe how the agents ideally should
and should not behave. [...] Importantly, the norms allow for the possibility
that actual behavior may at times deviate from the ideal, i.e., that violations of
obligations, or of agents’ rights, may occur” [89]. In other words, the norms of
global policies must be represented as soft constraints, which are used in detective
control systems where violations can be detected, instead of hard constraints
restricted to preventative control systems in which violations are impossible.
The typical example of the former is that you can enter a train without a ticket,
but you may be checked and sanctioned, and an example of the latter is that
you cannot enter a metro station without a ticket. Moreover, detective control is
the result of actions of agents and therefore subject to errors and influenceable
by actions of other agents. Therefore, it may be the case that violations are not
often enough detected, that law enforcement is lazy or can be bribed, there are
conflicting obligations in the normative system, that agents are able to block
the sanction, block the prosecution, update the normative system, etc. A game-
theoretic analysis can be used to study these issues of fraud and deception.
The third requirement is that norms should apply to a variety of agent types,
since agents can be motivated in various ways, as the daycare example illustrates.
We assume that a norm is a mechanism to obtain desired multi-agent system
behavior, and must therefore under normal or typical circumstances be fulfilled
for a range of agent types. Castelfranchi argues that sanctions are only one
of the means which motivate agents to respect obligations, besides “pro-active
actions, prevention from deviation and reinforcement of correct behavior, and
then also ‘positive sanctions’, social approval” [74]. Castelfranchi [74] argues that
an agent should fulfill an obligation because it is an obligation, not because there
is a sanction associated with it.
“True norms are aimed in fact at the internal control by the addressee
itself as a cognitive deliberative agent, able to understand a norm as
such and adopt it. [...] The use of external control and sanction is only
a sub-ideal situation and obligation.” [74]
We therefore use the distinction between violations and sanctions to distinguish
between the agent’s interpretation of the obligation, and its personal charac-
teristics or agent type. The agent types are inspired by the use of agent types
in the goal generation components of Broersen et al.’s BOID architecture [73].
Roughly, we distinguish among norm internalizing agents, respectful agents that
attempt to evade norm violations and that are motivated by what counts and
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does not count as a violation, and selfish agents that obey norms only due to
the associated sanctions, i.e. that are motivated by sanctions only. An obligation
without a sanction should be fulfilled, as Castelfranchi argues. But if fulfilling
the obligations has a cost then it is only fulfilled by respectful agents, not by
selfish agents, unless some incentives are provided or the agents dislike some so-
cial consequences of the violations. A respectful agent fulfills its obligations due
to the existence of the obligation, whereas a selfish agent fulfills its obligations
due to fear of consequences.
Respectful agents: agents that base their decisions solely on whether their
behavior respects the goals of the normative agents. They put their duties
before their own goals and desires: they maximize the fulfilment of obliga-
tions regardless to what happens to its own goals; even if the agent n did
not sanction them, the agent a would prefer to respect the obligation. We
say that respectful agents adopt the goal of the normative agent as their
preference.
Selfish agents: agents that base their decisions solely on the consequences of
their actions. If the obligation is respected, it is because agent a predicts that
the situation resulting from the fulfillment is preferred according to its own
goals and desires only: e.g., if it does not share its files, it knows that it can
be sanctioned, a situation it does not desire or want. But it is possible also
that there are not only material reasons, that is, not only for the damage
caused by the sanction. Nothing prevents that the content of the norm is
already a goal of the agent; moreover, agent a could have the desire not to
be considered a violator, or it knows that being considered a violator gives it
a bad reputation, so that it would not be trusted by other agent. However,
to stick to the obligation, the goal of not being a violator or of not being
sanctioned must be preferred by the agent to the desire or goal not to respect
the obligation (obligations usually have a cost): a weak sanction, as it often
happens, does not enforce the respect of a norm (e.g., the sanction is that
the access to a website is forbidden, but the agent has already downloaded
what it wanted).
To distinguish these cases, we distinguish between the decision to count behavior
as a violation, and to sanction it.
Of course, most agents are mixed types of agents between these two extremes.
Sometimes an agent is respectful and in other cases it is selfish. Balancing these
two extremes is an important part of the agent’s deliberation. The adoption
of the obligation as a goal can be considered as an additional factor when the
different alternatives are weighed according to its own goals and desires: so that
the newly added motivations can affect the decision of agent a and move it
towards an obligation-abiding behavior besides its own attitude towards that
goal and the possible consequences of its alternative decisions. However, if a
norm is effective in each case of the agent types, it is also effective for mixed
agents. therefore we can restrict ourselves to the extreme agent types in a game-
theoretical analysis.
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Given possible conditions for a norm, the fourth requirement is that norms
are as weak as possible, in the sense that the norms should not apply in cases
where this is undesired, and that sanctions should not be too severe. The latter
is motivated by a classical economic argument due to Beccaria, which says that if
sanctions are too high, they can no longer be used in cases where agents already
have violated a norm. Sanctions should be high enough to motivate selfish agents,
but they should not be too high.
Designing norms satisfying these requirements is an area of game theory
called mechanism design. In, amongst others, [59] we provide the following in-
formal definition of obligation, extending Boella and Lesmo [26]’s proposal. Ac-
cording to legal studies what distinguishes norms from mere power to damage
an agent is that sanctions are possible only in case of violations and which sit-
uations can be considered as violations is defined by the law: “nullum crimen,
nulla poena sine lege”. In our definition a norm specifies what will be considered
as a violation by the normative agent (item 2) and that the normative agent will
sanction only in case of violations (item 3). In this paper, we consider the set
of norms as given. Given a set of norms N , agent a is obliged by the normative
agent n to do x with sanction s, iff there is a norm n of N such that:
– The content x of the obligation is a desire and goal of n and agent n wants
that agent a adopts this as its decision since it considers agent a as respon-
sible for x.
– agent n has the desire and the goal that, if the obligation is not respected by
agent a, a prosecution process is started to determine if the situation “counts
as” a violation of the obligation and that, if a violation is recognized, agent
a is sanctioned.
– Both agent a and agent n do not desire the sanction: for agent a the sanction
is an incentive to respect the obligation, while agent n has no immediate
advantage from sanctioning.
This definition is extended in various papers in a number of ways. For ex-
ample, goals and desires are formalized as conditional rules, because norms and
obligations are typically represented by conditional rules.
2 Objectives
In this section we discuss the four objectives of our work on game-theoretical
approach to normative multiagent systems.
2.1 A representation of a normative multiagent systems that
combines the three existing representations of normative
multiagent systems
There are many approaches to conceptualizing and developing normative multi-
agent systems. The most popular class of approaches starts from logical relations
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among obligations (and sometimes permissions) in a deontic logic, and then ex-
tends the formalism with agent concepts like actions and time. Since the norms
in normative multiagent systems are typically represented explicitly, we may say
that these approaches start from the representation of norms. We call it the
deontic logic approach. Drawback of this approach is that there is no guideline
to tell how norms affect behavior.
The second class of approaches in normative multiagent systems starts from
the use of norms in agent decision making and interaction. In other words, given a
set of norms, how do the agents behave? We call it the normative agent architec-
ture approach. This more dynamic approach, focussing on behavior rather than
normative system structure, has the drawback that it does not give a guideline
how the normative system changes over time due to behavior of agents.
The third class of approaches in normative multiagent systems takes the
strategic interaction among agents and (representatives of) the normative system
as a starting point. We call it the game-theoretic approach. An example is the
distinction between controllable and uncontrollable agents in the Tennenholtz
and Brafman’s model. A drawback of their quantitative model is that it is not
easily combined with the other two approaches, such that explicit representation
of norms and normative decision making remains a problem.
Our first objective is to build a game theoretic model of normative multiagent
systems that extends both the deontic logic and the normative decision making
approach. We therefore refer to Goffman’s notion of strategic interaction rather
than the dominant economic equilibrium analysis. Particular challenges are:
KR-ASS Combining the qualitative formalisms used in knowledge representa-
tion and the quantitative ones used in artificial social systems,
AA-ASS Combining the micro representation of agent architectures with the
macro representations in social theories (the micro-macro dichotomy)
KR-AA The use of logic in knowledge representation and the use of architecture
in agent theory.
Typically there are several ways to align two theories in a common framework.
For example, for the latter problem, we may develop logical representations of
agents [73], or we may develop an architecture for a normative system [60].
2.2 A logical framework for qualitative risk analysis, building on
ideas in security and risk management
Risk analysis goes beyond traditional security by not only stating what is forbid-
den, but also accepting that things go wrong sometimes, and how to deal with
them. Therefore, risk analysis not only needs constraints like security, but also
contrary-to-duty or more generally normative reasoning.
Traditional risk analysis is quantitative and based on statistics. However, it
does not take the organizational structure, legal consequences and so on into
account. If we model a system, we may also take a more qualitative approach.
What we have to do to analyze risk is to build normative systems and agent
16 Boella, van der Torre
models, and combine them. This is precisely what we do in our normative mul-
tiagent systems. Thus, we replace classical statistical risk analysis by our game
theoretic analysis.
This thus explains why contrary-to-duty reasoning is essential for risk man-
agement, but there is much more to risk management than contrary-to-duty rea-
soning. In particular, given that agents can violate norms and can be sanctioned,
will agents violate the norms? Moreover, in such cases, will they be sanctioned?
2.3 A classification of situations in which one needs which elements
of normative systems as a social mechanism
In Section 1.2 we discussed various kinds of norms such as obligations, permis-
sions, counts-as conditionals, and procedural norms. Moreover, there are social
laws, conventions, rights, entitlements, legal institutions, and many more related
concepts. Each of these concepts may be considered as another kind of mecha-
nism. At this moment there is no consensus when we need these mechanisms,
and when we can use a simpler normative multiagent systems. Thus far only
two kinds of arguments: obligations are needed when there is contrary-to-duty
reasoning [89], and permissions are needed for multiple authorities [2].
2.4 Examples and classification which kind of normative multiagent
systems are to be used for which kind of applications in
computer science
Many new technologies use essentially the same kind of normative multiagent
system as older ones, but each application domain tends to reinvent its own
normative system, typically in a very naive way. For example, consider the use
of rollback and compensation in web technology, which may be seen as preven-
tative and detective control systems. We therefore aim to illustrate each kind of
normative multiagent system by a typical example, such as fraud and deception,
electronic commerce, secure knowledge management, and so on.
2.5 Scope of the objectives
We consider the organizational structures with its explicit roles as an orthogo-
nal issue to the game-theoretic approach to normative multi-agent systems. In
other words, we can study normative multi-agent systems without making these
aspects explicit. We discuss some of our results in this area in Section 4.6.
We do not discuss the design or implementation of normative multiagent
systems, though we believe that our programming language powerJava may be
used to implement normative multiagent systems.
Though norms are used to control the emergent behavior in MAS, and evolu-
tionary game theory is a useful tool to study this emergence, we do not address
this issue.
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3 Methodology
In our approach we use input/output logic for deontic logic, BOID architecture
for the agent architecture, and both game theory and recursive modeling for
artificial social systems.
3.1 Input/output logic
Input/output logic takes its origin in the study of conditional norms. These may
express desired features of a situation, obligations under some legal, moral or
practical code, goals, contingency plans, advice, etc. Typically they may be ex-
pressed in terms like: In such-and-such a situation, so-and-so should be the case,
or . . . should be brought about, or . . . should be worked towards, or . . . should be
followed – these locutions corresponding roughly to the kinds of norm mentioned.
3.2 BOID Architecture
The BOID architecture [73] is an extension of the BDI architecture with obliga-
tions (O). Each mental attitude is represented by a component in the architec-
ture, whose behavior is described by input/output logic. Moreover, qualitative
decision theories have been developed which extend this rule based formalism
with the decision rule to achieve goals and to evade goal violations.
In the BOID architecture there is no set of norms and norm descriptions, but
instead the agent description is adapted such that obligations (O) are added to
the mental states of agents. This can be interpreted as a kind of internalization of
the normative system by the agents, or as an abstraction which abstracts away
the normative system. This is the dominant approach in deontic logic [100],
in which typically one abstracts away from the norms to study logical relations
between obligations (though for criticism and alternative approaches see [1,116]).
Alternatively, in approaches based on the so-called Anderson reduction [4,5],
which defines obligation of p as the necessity that the absence of p leads to a
violation, O(p) = 2(¬p → V ), obligations are defined in terms of violability
and the state of the world. In the variant proposed by Meyer [101], who defines
obligation of action α as ‘the absence of α leads to a violation state, or O(α) =
[α]V , obligation is defined in terms of the agent’s behavior.
3.3 Tennenholtz’ classical game-theoretic approach to artificial
social systems
We first consider the so-called partially controlled multi-agent system (PCMAS)
approach of Brafman and Tennenholtz [70], one of the classical game-theoretical
studies of social laws in so-called artificial social systems developed by Tennen-
holtz and colleagues, because incentives like sanctions and rewards play a central
role in this theory. So-called controllable agents – agents controlled by the sys-
tem programmer – enforce social behavior by punishing and rewarding agents,
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and thus can be seen as representatives of the normative system. For example,
consider an iterative prisoner dilemma. A controlled agent can be programmed
such that it defects when it happens to encounter an agent which has defected
in a previous round.
The PCMAS model thus distinguishes between two kinds of agent interac-
tion in the game theory, namely between two normal (so-called uncontrollable)
agents, and between a normal and a controllable agent. We show in this paper
that this makes it a very useful model to give game-theoretic foundations to
norms. Whereas classical game theory is only concerned with interaction among
normal agents, it is the interaction among normal and controllable agents which
we use in our game theoretic foundations.
The PCMAS approach not only clarifies the design of punishments, but it
also illustrates the iterative and multi-agent character of social laws. However,
there are also drawbacks of the model, such that it cannot be used to give
a completely satisfactory game-theoretic foundation for norms. We would like
to express that a norm can be used for various kinds of agents, such as norm
internalizing agents, respectful agents that attempt to evade norm violations, and
selfish agents that obey norms only due to the associated sanctions. Therefore,
as classical game theory is too abstract to satisfactorily distinguish among agent
types, we consider also cognitive agents and qualitative game theory.
Several game-theoretic studies on social laws have been made by Tennen-
holtz and colleagues, for example based on off-line design of social laws [106],
the emergence of conventions [107], and the stability of social laws [108]. The ap-
proach of Brafman and Tennenholtz [70] distinguishes between controllable and
uncontrollable agents, analogous to the distinction between controllable and un-
controllable events in discrete event systems.
Controllable agents are agents controlled by the system programmer to en-
force social behavior by punishing and rewarding agents. The game-theoretic
model is the most common model for representing emergent behavior in a pop-
ulation. A single game consists of the usual payoff matrix. For example, the
prisoner’s dilemma is a two person game where each agent can either cooperate
or defect.
Definition 1. A k-person game g is defined by a k-dimensional matrix M of
size n1 × . . .× nk, where nm is the number of possible actions (or strategies) of
the m’th agent. The entries of M are vectors of length k of real numbers, called
pay-off vectors. A joint strategy in M is a tuple (i1, i2, . . . , ik), where for each
i ≤ j ≤ k, it is the case that 1 ≤ ij ≤ nj.
An iterative game consists of a sequence of single games.
Definition 2. A n-k-g iterative game consists of a set of n agents and a given k
person game g. The game is played repetitively an unbounded number of times.
At each iteration, a random k-tuple of agents play an instance of the game, where
the members of this k-tuple are selected with uniform distribution from the set
of agents.
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Efficiency is a global criterion for judging the “goodness” of outcomes from
the system’s perspective, unlike single payoffs which describe a single agent’s
perspective.
Definition 3. A joint strategy of a game g is called efficient if the sum of the
players pay-offs is maximal.
New in the Brafman-Tennenholtz model are the notions of punishment and
reward w.r.t. some joint strategy s, measuring the gain (benefit) or loss (pun-
ishment) of an agent if we can somehow change the joint behavior of the agents
from a chosen efficient solution s to s′.
Definition 4. Let s be a fixed joint strategy for a given game g, with pay-off
pi(s) for player i; in an instance of g in which a joint strategy s′ was played, if
pi(s) ≥ pi(s′) we say that i’s punishment w.r.t. s is pi(s)−pi(s′), and otherwise
we say that its benefit w.r.t. s is pi(s′)− pi(s).
Agents may need to be constrained to behave in a way that is locally sub-
optimal such that the multi-agent system is as efficient as possible. Brafman
and Tennenholtz call such a constraint a social law. Then they informally define
controlled agents:
“Agents not conforming to the social law are referred to as malicious
agents. In order to prevent the temptation to exploit the social law, we
introduce a number of punishing agents, designed by the initial designer,
that will play ‘irrationally’ if they detect behavior not conforming to the
social law, attempting to minimize the payoff of malicious agents. The
knowledge that future participants have of the punishment policy would
deter deviations and eliminate the need for carrying it out. Hence, the
punishing behavior is used as a threat aimed at deterring other agents
from violating the social law. This threat is (part of) the control strategy
adopted by the controllable agents in order to influence the behavior of
the uncontrollable agents. Notice that this control strategy relies on the
structural assumption that uncontrollable agents are expected utility
maximizers.”
They consider the design of punishments, and show, for example, necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of a punishing strategy.
We believe that PCMAS can be used to give game-theoretic foundations to
norms, though Brafman and Tennenholtz do not use or consider the terminology
of normative systems or deontic logic. The model fulfills our two requirements
by explaining several aspects of norms, such as the fact that they can be used
iteratively, that sanctions are associated to it, and that they can be applied to
various kinds of agents.
In particular, a useful property of the PCMAS model is that it uses the
game-theoretic machinery to study not only interaction among normal agents,
but also interaction among the controlled agents and the normal agents. Since
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the controlled agents are representatives of the normative system, this means
that the game-theoretic machinery is used to study the interaction among the
normative system and the agents.
However, the emphasis on modeling uncontrollable agents as utility maximiz-
ers implies that they only obey the norm because they are afraid of the sanction.
Thus the model does not fulfill the third requirement because it seems to ex-
clude the possibility that an agent obeys the norm simply due to its existence.
In social theory, for example, agents have been studied which internalize norms
in the sense that they incorporate norms as their own goal, or respectful agents
trying to obey the norms without internalizing them.
Maybe the game-theoretic machinery can be extended to take such social
agents into account. For example, a norm internalizing agent may be defined as
an uncontrollable agent which simply copies the utility function of a punishing
agent, and a respectful agent which avoids sanctions even when the number of
punishing agents is too low, for example by assuming the number of punishing
agents is much higher than it is in reality. They may for example be ashamed to
be caught while driving without a train ticket.
However, such a solution does not seem very satisfactory. For the norm in-
ternalizing agents, they not only obey the norm but they also start to act as
policemen, which seems to go to far. Moreover, even when punishment is low
or absent, a respectful agent may obey the norm (as in the daycare example).
There seem to be several alternative ways to define respectful agents, but they
seem to have their own drawbacks.
Moreover, there are also some more technical problems. For PCMAS to give
game-theoretic foundations to norms, we first have to define the syntax of a norm.
Typically norms are expressed as modal sentences expressing that p is obliged,
O(p) in a deontic logic, or p is permitted, P (p). Since in the PCMAS setting we
have actions or strategies only, we define Oi(α, p) for agent i is obliged to do
action α, otherwise he is sanctioned with punishment p. Since a punishment p
is defined as pi(s)− pi(s′), the first problem is how to define the chosen efficient
solution s′. It is implicit in the condition that in the situation in which no norm is
violated, no agent is punished (the Nero/Caligula example of the introduction).
Finally, whether an obligation Oi(α, p) holds in PCMAS or not cannot be
seen from the game’s definition, but only from the behavior of the controlled
agents. In other words, it can only be derived from the design of punishments
not explicit in the game theory.
3.4 Recursive modeling
Classical decision and game theory have been criticized for their assumptions
of ideality. Several alternatives have been proposed that take the limited or
bounded rationality of decision makers into account. For example, Newell [102]
and others develop theories in artificial intelligence and agent theory replace
probabilities and utilities by informational (knowledge, belief) and motivational
attitudes (goal, desire), and the decision rule by a process of deliberation. Brat-
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man [71] further extends such theories with intentions for sequential decisions
and norms for multiagent decision making.
Alternatively, Gmytrasiewitcz and Durfee [80] replace the equilibria analysis
in game theory by recursive modelling, which considers the practical limitations
of agents in realistic settings such as acquiring knowledge and reasoning so that
an agent can build only a finite nesting of models about other agents’ decisions.
“Recursive modelling method views a multi agent situation from the
perspective of an agent that is individually trying to decide what physical
and/or communicative actions it should take right now.” [80]
Boella and Lesmo [26] therefore propose the following definition of a sanction-
based obligation in terms of beliefs, goals and desires, inspired by Goffman’s
game-theoretic interpretation of obligations and by recursive modelling. Boella
and Lesmo formalize this definition in a game-theoretic framework in which they
recursively model the normative agent’s behavior. The formalization is based on
multi-attribute utility theory for taking into account the different aspects of
the world for which agents have preferences. An important advantage of Boella
and Lesmo’s definition is that it does not introduce additional mental attitudes,
but it defines obligations in terms of beliefs, desires and goals. Moreover, they
distinguish various reasons why agents fulfil or violate obligations.
“An obligation holds when there is an agent A, the normative agent, who
has a goal that another (or more than one) agent B, the bearer agent,
satisfies a goal G and who, in case he knows that the agent B has not
adopted the goal G, can decide to perform an action Act which (nega-
tively) affects some aspect of the world which (presumably) interests B.
Both agents know these facts.” [26, p.496]
The approach overcomes some of the limitations discussed in the previous
section. First, obligations of the agents can be formalized as desires or goals of
the normative agent. This representation may be paraphrased as “Your wish
is my command”, the title of this paper, because the desires or wishes of the
normative agent are the obligations or commands of the other agents. The goals
of the normative system describe the ideal behavior of the system.
Second, structural relations between agents playing roles in a normative sys-
tem like legislators, who create norms, judges, who count behavior as violations
and associate sanctions, and policemen who enforce sanctions, can be represented
by the standard hierarchical structure of agents. For example, the normative
agent an+1 may contain the role of a legislator a1, a judge a2 and a policeman
a3. Such a relation between the normative agent and other agents is probably
not reductive, as the normative system also contains properties which cannot be
reduced to roles of normal agents.
Third, as illustrated by Boella and Lesmo by several examples, agents take
the normative system into account by playing games with it. For example, an
agent considers whether its actions will lead to a reaction of the normative sys-
tem such as being sanctioned. In their model, the agent can evade sanctions by
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for example ensuring that the normative agent does not observe their behav-
ior, or by bribing the system. The advantage of the approach is that standard
techniques developed in decision and game theory can be applied to normative
reasoning. Moreover, a legislator can play a game with the normative agent and
another agent to see whether a new norm it introduces will be complied with,
and which kind of sanctions it has to associate with the norm to achieve the
desired behavior.
The normative systems as agents perspective together with the attribution
of mental attitudes to these normative systems is not only, as Tuomela [111]
proposed, a powerful metaphor leading to useful techniques, but it can also
be explained from a conceptual point of view in several ways. For example,
according to Wooldridge and Jennings [115] the conditions for calling a system
an agent are its autonomy to control its actions and internal state, its social
ability to interact with other agents, its reactivity to the changes it observes in
the environment, and its pro-activeness due to goal directed behavior and taking
the initiative. All these conditions are met by normative systems. First, it is
autonomous in counting behavior as violations and applying sanctions. Second,
it interacts with these other agents by influencing their behavior, and the other
agents interact with it by for example creating norms. Third, it is reactive since
counting behavior as a violation of norms depends on its observations of such
behavior. Fourth, it is proactive since this action is taken without any explicit
triggering action of the agent, who would of course instead try to evade being
violators and being sanctioned.
Moreover, attribution of mental attitudes to normative systems can be ex-
plained by the interpretation of normative multiagent systems as dynamic social
orders. According to Castelfranchi [74], a social order is a pattern of interactions
among interfering agents “such that it allows the satisfaction of the interests
of some agent A”. These interests can be a shared goal, a value that is good
for everybody or for most of the members; for example, the interest may be to
avoid accidents. The use of goals of a multiagent system can be explained by
the notion of social delegation [77]. Social delegation describes the behavior of a
social group or institution where some of the agents, on behalf of the other ones,
have to achieve some goal which is part of the plans of all members of the group
or institution. In this interpretation, the use of sanctions can be explained by
the notion of social control, “an incessant local (micro) activity of its units” [74],
aimed at restoring the regularities prescribed by norms, because a dynamic so-
cial order requires a continuous activity for ensuring that the normative system’s
goals are achieved. In case of sanction-based obligations, this ability is required
since the application of sanctions in response to violations cannot be taken for
granted.
For example, consider a peer-to-peer system like Napster. Each individual
agent does not want that all other agents start to download files from their
computer system. From the individual desires that other agents do not all use
only their side, we get to a shared or group desire that downloads are evenly
distributed over the network. In a normative system, this shared desire may
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lead to a norm which says that one should not use computers which already
are used intensively. The agents accept this norm, because they rationally see
that this increases their own benefits. This example of social delegation is of
course analogous to the development of moral principles based on the Kantian
imperative: do not do to others what you could not accept yourself. Since, in
some cases, for the agents it is rational to violate the norm, sanctions are added
to enforce their respect. In our peer-to-peer example, those agents who do not
share enough files get a reduced download speed rate.
As a more abstract example involving sanctions, consider the widely discussed
prisoner’s dilemma. In this example, both agents are better of if they cooperate,
but rationality tells them to defect (since this is the only Nash equilibrium).
Since there is a shared desire that both agents cooperate, in a normative system a
norm will be created that counts defection as a violation that will be sanctioned.
The agents will accept this norm and the related sanction, because rationality
tells them that they will be better off. In this example, the sanction should be
high enough to deter the agents from defecting, for which we can use the game
described above.
4 Results
This section is structured along the complexity of the interaction between the
normative system and the agents, as proposed in [23]. In the simplest setting
there is only a single agent and a single normative system it is subject too.
Then we consider the role of agents in a normative system (creating or enforcing
norms, like legislators, policeman, judges, etc. in legal systems). We then also
consider interaction among agents in contracting settings (where the norms of
contract live in legal setting of contract frames or legal institutions) and, finally,
we consider the most complex case of multiple normative systems (country law
vs European law, virtual communities, etc.). Each subsection extends the theory
developed in the previous subsection.
4.1 Violation games: interacting with normative systems, the
obligation mechanism, with applications in trust, fraud and
deception.
In [46] we start with considering the normative system from the (subjective)
viewpoint of an agent. We also test our model in Tennenholtz artificial social
systems as enforceable social laws [43].
Problems: Normative systems can be divided in preventative and detective
ones. In the former, a system is built such that violations are impossible (you
cannot enter metro station without a ticket), in the latter violations can be
detected (you can enter train without a ticket but you may be checked and
sanctioned). When we accept that norms can be violated, then we go beyond
classical cryptographic security into the area of risk analysis, fraud, deception,
trust and reputation, and so on. In all these areas, we have to find a way to
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asses risk, anticipate behavior of other agents, and so on. Numbers are usually
not available, so we develop a qualitative game theory for agents in normative
systems.
Technique: Introduction of the notion of obligation and its relation with sanc-
tions. Combination of normative reasoning and game theory. Analysis of the way
an agent can violate obligations without being sanctioned by the normative sys-
tem. Analysis of contrary-to-duty reasoning.
Case-studies. Transaction trust in normative multiagent systems [19], and
energy markets [20].
4.2 Institutionalized games: counts-as mechanism, with applications
in distributed systems, grid, p2p, virtual communities
We study permission and authorization in policies for virtual communities of
agents [49], and local versus global policies and centralized versus decentralized
control in virtual communities of agents [41].
4.3 Negotiation games: MAS interaction in a normative system,
norm creation action mechanism, with applications in electronic
commerce and contracting
In [58] we consider social phenomena in normative multiagent systems like di-
rected and group obligations, how group obligations can be distributed and how
norms can emerge. We consider also argument games for interactive access con-
trol [21], and negotiation of the distribution of obligations with sanctions among
autonomous agents [38,56].
Application area: Contracting among agents in e-commerce applications.
Problem: In an open multi-agent system agents should be able to constrain
the behavior of other agents with whom they are interacting, for example when
making economic transactions. Thus it is necessary to have a way to enable
agents to create new obligations which are enforced by the normative system.
Contracts define the creation of new obligations and permissions by agents in-
volved in a negotiation. The possibility to create new norms is defined by the
legal system itself, using constitutive norms.
Technique: Introducing constitutive norms and their relation to regulative
norms like obligations and permissions. Constitutive or counts-as norms have
first been studied in speech act theory, and theories of construction of social
reality. They define so-called institutional facts, and we extend their definition
so they also define the way in which normative systems can change.
4.4 Norm creation games: MAS structure of a normative system,
permission mechanism, with applications in legal theory.
We consider the agents from the viewpoint of the normative system: it not only
views the agents as subjects which it obliges, prohibits and permits, sanctions
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and controls, but it also views the agents as subjects that play roles in the system,
for example which can modify the normative system [35]. We consider also game
specification in normative multiagent systems based on the Trias Politica [39],
and the evolution of artificial Social Systems [44],
Application area: Legal systems. Introducing norms in multi-agent systems
requires a correct understanding of how norms work in human society. It is
necessary to build formal models which match the complexities of legal systems.
Problems: Open multi-agent systems cannot be regulated off-line since new
unforeseen situations emerge and new norms must be added runtime to deal
with specific situations without having to modify the entire set of norms. Legal
systems cannot be composed only of obligations, since it becomes too complex
to specify new exceptional cases which are not subject to the obligations. So
permissions are introduced as a way to specify exceptions. Moreover, the relation
between permissions and obligations issued by different levels of hierarchical
normative systems is considered.
Technique: Introducing permissions and their relation to obligations. Intro-
ducing hierarchical normative systems and priority relations among norms. Per-
missions as exceptions are defined in the input/output logic framework [63], and
the notion of authorization is studied [48].
4.5 Control games: interaction among normative systems, nested
norms mechanism, with applications in security and secure
knowledge management systems
In [62] we consider systems that contain multiple normative systems. We consider
also the delegation of control to autonomous agents (called defender agents) [33].
Application area: Regulating virtual communities of peer agents by means of
policies, like in Secure knowledge management.
Problem: In scenarios like grid architectures or peer to peer systems every
node can be seen as an autonomous agent. As such it can impose freely norms on
the use of its resources. When the agent joins a virtual community, it must offer
its resources at disposal of the other members according to the global policies
of the community. Global policies about local policies, however, have not been
studied yet, since they require nesting of norms.
Technique: When there are several normative systems, then global norms
may put some restrictions on the possibility of issuing local norms. For example,
European law limits the way European countries can create and enforce norms.
The problem is how to describe global policies on local policies. Our game theo-
retic analysis illustrates that a naive approach does not work, and we therefore
have to formalize an idea suggested by von Wright called delegation of will.
4.6 Related topics
Our work on the game-theoretic approach to normative multiagent systems has
led us to study some related topics, where we have obtained the following results.
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– Model of emergence of norms called the social delegation cycle [64], including
a study of the use of power in norm negotiation [66].
– A foundational ontology of organizations and roles [57], an agent oriented
ontology of social reality [36], and a model of organizations as socially con-
structed agents in the agent oriented paradigm [47]. We study the attribution
of mental attitudes to roles [37] and we define groups as agents with men-
tal attitudes [40]. We also consider the representation of organizations in
artificial social systems [61].
We develop an extension of the programming language Java called powerJava
[10]. We consider power in powerJava [8] and interaction among objects [12].
We bridge agent theory and object orientation by importing social roles
in object oriented languages [7] and by agent-like communication among
objects [11].
– Based on various social viewpoints on multiagent systems [28] we consider
definitions of coalitions [30,31] based on admissible agreements among goal-
directed agents [25]. We consider reduction of coalition structures via con-
tracts’ representation [29] and an abstraction from power to coalition struc-
tures [27].
– We consider the role of roles in agent communication languages [24], and pro-
pose role based semantics as a synthesis between mental attitudes and social
commitments [15,16,25]. We distinguish propositional and action commit-
ment in agent communication [17]. We consider FIPA communicative acts
also in defeasible logic [18].
5 Interdisciplinary aspects
Normative multiagent systems are an example of the use of sociological theories
in multiagent systems, and more generally of the relation between agent the-
ory and the social sciences such as sociology, philosophy, economics, and legal
science. Other examples are the use of the social concept of “power” in pro-
gramming language powerJava, see also [9,13]. As Castelfranchi [75] argues , not
only can social and cognitive concepts like norms and beliefs should be used in
agent theory, but agent theory should be used to enrich social sciences, making
it more computational. For example, in the area of coordination and organi-
zation [53], organizational concepts may be used in coordination languages, or
these languages may be used for human organizations. However, our theory is
a computer science approach. It may be used outside computer science, but we
restrict ourselves to computer science. For an example of how our theory may
be used in cognitive science see [45]. For some new challenges for deontic logic
due to our theory, see [22,34].
Our game-theoretic approach to normative systems combines deontic logic,
agent architecture and artificial social systems. Deontic logic in computer science
is an area of knowledge representation and reasoning within artificial intelligence,
and related to philosophical logic. Agent architecture is an area of artificial intel-
ligence related to software engineering and psychology. Artificial social systems
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are a kind of game theory related to economics, linguistics and organizational
theory.
The need for social science theories and concepts like norms in multiagent sys-
tems is now well established. For example, Wooldridge’s weak notion of agency
is based on flexible autonomous action [115], and social ability as the interaction
with other agents and co-operation is one of the three meanings of flexibility; the
other two are reactivity as interaction with the environment, and pro-activeness
as taking the initiative. In this definition autonomy refers to non-social aspects,
such as operating without the direct intervention of humans or others, and have
some kind of control over their actions and internal state. For some other ar-
guments for the need for social theory in multiagent systems, see, for example,
[69,79,114]. For a more complete discussion on the need of social theory in gen-
eral, and norms in particular, see the AgentLink roadmap [93].
Social concepts like norms are important for multiagent systems, because
multiagent system research and sociology share the interest in the relation be-
tween micro-level agent behaviour and macro-level system effects. In sociology
this is the (in)famous micro-macro link [3] that focuses on the relation between
individual agent behaviour and characteristics at the level of the social system.
In multiagent system research, this boils down to the question “How to en-
sure efficiency at the level of the multiagent system whilst respecting individual
autonomy?”. According to Verhagen [113] three possible solutions to this prob-
lem comprise of the use of central control which gravely jeopardizes the agent’s
autonomy, internalized control like the use of social laws [106], and structural
coordination [103] including learning norms.
6 Summary
Normative multi-agent systems study general and domain independent proper-
ties of norms. It builds on results obtained in deontic logic, the logic of obliga-
tions and permissions, for the representation of norms as rules, the application of
such rules, contrary-to-duty reasoning and the relation to permissions. However,
it goes beyond logical relations among obligations and permissions by explain-
ing the relation among social norms and obligations, relating regulative norms
to constitutive norms, explaining the evolution of normative systems, and much
more. Our work on the game-theoretic approach to normative multi-agent sys-
tems has the following four objectives:
1. How to combine the three existing representations of normative multiagent
systems? A representation of a normative multiagent systems that builds
on and extends the deontic logic approach for the explicit representation of
norms, the agent architecture approach for software engineering of agents,
and the game-theoretic artificial social systems approach for model of inter-
action.
2. Why do we need norms in computer science? A logical framework for quali-
tative risk analysis, building on ideas in security and risk management.
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3. When do we need which kind of norms? A classification of situations in
which one needs which elements of normative systems (e.g., obligations, per-
missions, counts-as conditionals).
4. How can we use norms in computer science applications? Examples and
classification of which kind of normative multiagent systems are to be used
for which kind of applications in computer science.
In our approach we use input/output logic for deontic logic, BOID architec-
ture for the agent architecture, and both game theory and recursive modeling
for artificial social systems. The following table summarizes our results:
Behavior violation games institutional games negotiation games norm creation games control games
Structure Interacting MAS interaction MAS structure Interaction
with NS in NS of NS among NSs
Mechanism Obligation Counts-as Norm creation actions Permission nested rules
Theory BDI, deontic logic
Application Trust Distributed systems e-commerce security, SKM, policies
Fraud, deception Virtual communities e-contracting
grid, p2p
In our work, we use game theory as basis of NMAS. However, vice versa, it
is an open problem whether our model / approach also has something to say
about the role of norms in game theory.
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